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INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR BANK CAPITAL REGULATION 
Abstract. The paper analyzes the evolution of the introduction of international standards for 
bank capital regulation. 
The aim of the research is to study international standards for bank capital regulation and 
their impact on financial stability and sustainability of domestic banking systems. 
The 2007—2009 Global Financial Crisis was perhaps the greatest banking and financial 
crisis since bank failures and the financial panic of the Great Depression in early 1930s. According 
to academics and professionals, there has been much debate over the last decade as to whether the  
2007—2009 banking crisis was primarily a solvency crisis or a liquidity crisis. Capital adequacy of 
banks today is the main indicator of increasing society’s confidence in banking systems. The 
flexible and balanced implementation of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
recommendations on the assessment of bank capital adequacy is of particular importance in the 
context of the deepening economic crisis caused by COVID-19 quarantine restrictions. 
Regulation of bank capital is primarily settles by the ability to execute basic functions 
inherent in it. A number of shocks in connection with the crisis require the renewal and search for a 
new paradigm of regulation, which today is focused on achieving financial stability, overcoming 
pro-cyclicality, especially in the banking sector. One of the latest developments in the field of bank 
capital regulation has been the implementation of international banking supervision standards 
recommended by BCBS, which have been transformed from Basel I, Basel II, Basel III, Basel 3.5 to 
Basel IV. 
The new ideology suggests that in times of financial and economic crisis or in anticipation 
of growing uncertainty in the economy, it is necessary to abandon the idea of bank capital 
management and the creation of financial reserves to maintain liquidity and stability of financial 
institutions. These measures will not be able to protect the bank from default and bankruptcy. This 
ideology has become a new paradigm of effective banking regulation, which can be formulated as 
an accepted set of three vectors: risk; risk management; risk-oriented supervision. 
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Introduction. The importance of standards in the field of financial services is explained by 
their extension to all segments of the population and types of organizations. Standards are 
especially important in the process of financial inclusion: protecting the rights of those unfamiliar 
with the subtleties of credit, insurance and other customer service is an impossible task without the 
introduction of regulations governing the full range of financial services’ applied aspects — from 
advertising to operations, from staff training to concluding contract’s procedures. In this aspect, the 
banking business is no exception, the reliability and competitiveness of which depends on the 
adequacy of its capital base. 
The crisis in recent decades has caused a resonance in the global and domestic financial 
markets for the introduction of effective instruments to regulate the bank capital adequacy. This 
issue is addressed at all levels of regulators and organizations in each country. 
Capital adequacy of banks today is the main indicator of increasing society's confidence in 
banking systems. That’s why the issue of assessing bank capital adequacy to cover the risks to 
which they are exposed in the course of their activities, is given considerable attention in both 
international and domestic banking practice. 
Flexible and balanced implementation of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
recommendations on assessing bank capital adequacy is especially important in the context of the 
deepening financial crisis caused by COVID-19 quarantine restrictions. This is accompanied by a 
significant deterioration in the financial condition of borrowers and the quality of loan portfolios in 
many banks, rising cost of borrowed capital, complicating the procedure for raising funds by 
enterprises of the real sector [1, p. 5]. 
One of the main assertions of international standards is that all banks must have sufficient 
capital to cover all significant risks to which their business is vulnerable. It is the requirements of 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision that provide a closer link between capital 
requirements and the risks inherent in banks in the course of their operations. 
Despite the consistent development and unification of international banking standards, the 
problem of improving approaches to the regulation and evaluation of bank capital adequacy’s 
statistical component remains relevant. Increased attention to this problem by members of the 
banking community around the world is due to the lack of a universal approach to determining the 
minimum allowable amount of capital for banks, which would be equally used for the domestic 
banking system of each country. Therefore, the problem of defining transition periods for the 
implementation of international standards for the regulation of bank capital, is an important issue 
for research. 
Analysis of recent research and problem statement. The review of official documents  
[2—9] and others shows that approaches to calculating equity and risk assessment have been 
refined in recent years, but the main criterion still remains the same — capital adequacy depends on 
the level of risk of bank losses. 
The scientific works of foreign researchers such as A. Rossignolo [10], D. Craig [11],  
A. Thakor [12], R. De Young [13], E. Carletti [14] and others are devoted to the problem of bank 
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capital regulation with the international standards. The presented scientific works consider 
problematic issues related to the introduction of international standards for the regulation of bank 
capital, transformational areas of considering operational, credit, market and other risks in 
determining the adequacy of bank capital. 
A. Thakor concluded that the appropriate regulators’ response should be to increase capital 
requirements in order to reduce solvency risk, rather than freezing billions of dollars in real estate 
by requiring banks to invest in «high-quality liquid assets» (within the new requirements for bank 
liquidity) [12, p. 109]. 
The combination of regulation processes for bank liquidity and bank capital under Basel III 
has launched a new study. As noted by R. DeYoung, S. Distinguin and F. Tarazi, the liquidity of 
bank’s assets, the stability of bank’s liabilities and the desired level of bank’s equity are 
interrelated, which is fully understood by both regulators and researchers [13]. In addition, a recent 
paper by E. Carletti, I. Goldstein and A. Leonello examined the interdependence of bank capital and 
liquidity by constructing a global game model to analyze the interdependence of bank capital and 
liquidity on the likelihood of solvency and liquidity crises [14]. 
Among Ukrainian scientists should be noted studies of M. Zveryakov [15], S. Naumenkova 
[1], O. Mozhovyi [16]. The authors of the presented scientific works consider the problematic 
aspects of international standards’ introduction in the domestic banking services market; 
opportunities and prospects of considering risks in calculating bank capital adequacy; determine the 
leading role of bank’s capitalization level on the financial stability of the system as a whole; 
formation of the concept of banking activity focused on risk-oriented supervision from the point of 
view of bank capital regulation. 
Further research is intended to help address the main challenges associated with the 
implementation of international standards for bank capital regulation in terms of growing crises, 
especially those caused by COVID-19. 
Therefore, the aim of the paper is to study the international standards of bank capital 
regulation and their impact on financial stability and sustainability of domestic banking systems. 
Research results. Regulation of bank capital is primarily settles by the ability to execute 
basic functions inherent in it, which are defined as protective, operational and regulatory. But the 
range of bank’s capital functions, which increase its importance in ensuring the stable operation of 
banks, can be supplemented by additional ones, namely: operational (insurance function for 
depositors and creditors, investment, innovation, guarantee, control, regulatory, income function, 
valuation, coordination) and strategic (indicative, mobilizing, communicative, stimulating). 
To implement them in the global regulatory practice, a number of standards have been 
developed, which today are called Basel I, Basel II, Basel III, Basel 3.5 and Basel IV. 
The harmonization of banking capital standards began more than 30 years ago, when in 
early 1988 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published the International Convergence 
of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (BCBS, 1988) [2], which became known as the 
Accord «Basel I». At the time, after the Latin American sovereign debt crisis in the early 1980s, 
Basel I was the first attempt to internationally harmonize the definition of bank capital and the 
amount of capital which banks should maintain. 
This first Basel Accord had three objectives, according to the BCBS itself: to ensure that 
banks had sufficient capital to cover their risks; to align the playing field between international 
banks; to promote the comparison of banks’ capital positions [15, p. 18]. 
One of the weaknesses of Basel I was that all private sector loans were given the same 
weight of risk and capital requirements. This encouraged banks to focus on riskier loans that have 
higher expected returns (regulatory capital arbitrage). Therefore, the subsequent introduction of 
Basel II was aimed at solving this problem. 
The Basel II Agreement, «International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards — A Revised Concept» (BCBS, 2004) [3], was adopted in June 2004 and enforced in 
Europe in January 2008. The introduction of Basel II focused on self-regulation and market 
discipline; it is based on the definition of three pillars (Fig. 1). 
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Fig. 1. Three Pillars of Basel II 
Source: BCBS, 2004. 
 
Basel II allowed the most experienced banks to develop internal risk assessment models in 
order to calculate the amount of capital needed to cover, thus solving the Basel I problem by 
applying regulatory capital arbitrage. However, the ability to develop their own risk models has led 
banks to underestimate the risk in their loan portfolios and, consequently, allowed them to 
significantly reduce the required amount of capital. 
Following the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, which was followed by a global 
banking crisis in both the United States and Europe, international banking supervisors recognized 
the need to significantly increase bank capital levels. Basel III of December 2010, «A Global 
Regulatory Framework for More Sustainable Banks and Banking Systems» (BCBS, 2010) [4], 
addressed this issue by narrowing the items considered in the calculation of capital (reducing use of 
hybrid debt instruments executed as part of capital) and by increasing the required capital adequacy 
ratios. The main changes which have taken place within Basel III are shown in Fig. 2. 
 
 
* SA — standardized approach; RWAs — the amount of risk-weighted assets 
Fig. 2. Main Revisions to the Basel III Framework 
Source: compiled by the authors on the basis of materials (BCBS, 2010; Rossignolo, A.F. 2020). 
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In Europe, Basel III has been transposed into law, in particular through the adoption in 2013 
of the «Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)» and the «Capital Requirements Directive IV 
(CRD IV)». Moreover, as a result, a single supervisory mechanism (SSM) has been established 
within the European Banking Union, which distributes supervisory functions between European 
Central Bank, as well as a single mechanism for resolving instability (SRM). 
Adequate supervision and regulation of the banking sector may be even more important in 
Europe rather than in United States, as in Europe the financial system is more bank-based and 
therefore more likely to have a significant impact on the economy when crises arise. 
The Basel III agreement on the completion of post-crisis reforms, dated December 2017, 
largely solves the incentive problems associated with banks’ minimizing the estimated risk weights 
using their own internal models, in order to minimize regulatory capital requirements. To mitigate 
these incentives, so-called floors have been set: the percentage of standard risk weights set by 
supervisors below which capital cannot decline (BCBS, 2017) [5]. 
BCBS has decided to introduce floors in stages over five years. Initial values will be 
introduced from January 2022 and will be set at 50% of standardized risk weights, and then will 
increase by 5% annually from 2022 to 2026, until they are set at 70%, and then finally increase up 
to 72.5% in 2027 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2018) [6] (Tabl. 1). 
Table 1 
Basel III Transitional Arrangements, 2017—2027 
Risk 
coverage Transition status 
The third phase 
of Basel III 
 
Capital 
All minimum requirements have been fully phased in by 2019, that is, common 
equity, total capital and the capital conservation buffer, as well as deductions 
from capital. 
Capital instruments that no longer qualify as non-core Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital 
have been phased out since 2013. This will end in 2021. 
The initial phase 
 
 




Capital requirements for investments in funds and exposure to central 
counterparties, the standardized approach to counterparty credit risk, the revised 
securitization framework, and the interest rate risk in the banking book and large 
exposure framework have all become fully effective. 
The revised standardized approach for credit risk and the revised IRB, CVA, 
operational risk and market risk frameworks will become effective in 2022. 
The output floor will be phased-in in 2022 starting with 50% and it will increase 
every year by five percentage points until 2026, with the final floor of 72.5% 
reached in 2027. 









The Net Stable Funding Ratio and Liquidity Coverage Ratio became fully 
effective in 2018 and 2019, respectively. 
The initial phase 
Leverage 
The initial exposure definition became effective in 2018. 
 
The revised exposure definition and the G-SIB buffer will become fully effective 
in 2022. 
The final phase 
 
The initial phase 
Source: [17, p. 28].  
 
Under Basel III, the most important requirement is capital adequacy, which depends on the 
amount of risk-weighted assets (RWA). However, the question of calculating RWA has never been 
fully regulated in any of Basel Accords. Banks can either apply a standardized approach (SA) based 
on risk weights determined by supervisors or recognized rating agencies, or use an internal rating 
model (IRB) which allows to set bank’s own risk weighting criteria. In practice, this means that 
banks can have a direct impact on the final level of required regulatory capital. According to  
V. Le Lesle and S. Avramova, it is difficult to find a better incentive to play in such a calculation 
process [18]. The Economist called the received IRB capital «capital for self-construction» [19]. 
Basel IV aims to address this issue by «restoring confidence in the calculation of RWA and 
improving the comparability of bank capital adequacy ratios» (Finalizing Basel III IN BRIEF 2017) 
[7]. The main changes, which have taken place within Basel IV, are shown in Fig. 3. 
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Fig. 3. Basel IV Capital Floor 
Source: compiled by the authors on the basis of materials (Craig D. at all, 2019). 
 
Basel IV contains four major innovations. First, the use of IRB to calculate credit risk has 
been excluded due to certain typical risks. Only SA is allowed for capital. In turn, the risk weights 
for banks and other financial institutions, as well as individual corporations, should not be assessed 
using the extended IRB, while changes in basic IRB are allowed. 
Second, due to the high level of unpredictability of operational risk, the only method of 
quantifying such a risk is the use of SA. In this aspect, internal models have been found to be too 
unreliable (Finalizing Basel III IN BRIEF 2017) [7]. Naturally, SA can increase comparability 
between financial institutions and equal conditions in this regard. On the other hand, due to the huge 
differences between modern banking models, this may harm some of them by imposing a «one size 
fits all» policy. 
The third innovation complements the risk-based structure of capital adequacy. For global 
systemically important banks (G-SIBs), risk independence is a new requirement. It sets a special 
additional leverage ratio for the G-SIB, «to support the relative incentives provided by both  
risk-weighted and risk-free capital constraints» (High-level Summary of Basel III Reforms 2017) 
[8]. The final leverage ratio is defined as the sum of the base requirement of 3% and half of the  
risk-weighted higher loss claims, which are determined annually by Financial Stability Board 
(FSB). For example, according to FSB list, in 2019 HSBC was placed in the basket  3 (2%) [20]. 
Thus, it will be required to adhere to the leverage ratio buffer at 4% (3% + 0.5 × 2%). 
The fourth, and, perhaps, most controversial requirement included in the Basel IV 
framework is the introduction of a capital requirements floor calculated on the basis of internal 
models. This is a fixed level for all RWAs calculated using SA, below which the number of RWAs 
based on IRB cannot be reduced. The selected threshold is 72.5% of RWA calculated using SA. For 
example, if a bank uses IRB to calculate its RWA, the total amount cannot be less than 72.5% of 
such bank’s RWA, calculated by SA: 
IRB-based calculation  72.5% SA-based calculation.     
Post floor RWAs = Max (pre-floor RWAs, 72.5% x standardized RWAs) 
Pre-floor RWA 
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If IRB-based calculation is below 72.5% of SA-based calculation, a bank is required to use 
72.5% of SA-based result as the amount of RWA in the process of calculating the required 
regulatory capital to be maintained. No matter how necessary these reforms are, their final form is 
far from perfect. Neither «restored trust» nor «facilitated comparability» (Financial Basel III IN 
BRIEF 2017) [7], which regulators are striving for, are completely worth the price that EU banks 
will have to pay for complying with these requirements. Most importantly, the negative 
consequences to be expected with the implementation of these rules may result in less regulated 
SBS. In summary, it can be provided the following characteristics of main novelties (Tabl. 2). 
Table 2 
Basel IV Novelties Overview 
Novelties Pros Contras General summary 
SA for credit 
risk of certain 
exposures 
Comparability  
(equal conditions of the game); 
Less risk of calculations’ distortion; 
Considered differences  
in the nature of exposures 
Less accuracy; 
Capital shortage, which 
leads to an indirect 
increase in capital 
requirements 
Useful, if it’s determined 
individually for each 
institution considering its 
business model; 
Alternative: more 




(equal conditions of the game); 




Completion of the specific GSIB 
structure (after GSIB Capital 
addition) 
Dependence on a fairly 
arbitrary GSIB definition; 
Incentive to take more risk 
Adjustments are needed to 





The last stronghold which prevents 
too low RWA score for banks 
Arbitrary; 
Half of the capital deficit is 
related to this; 
Incentive to take more risk 
Arbitrary; 
Not necessarily in the 
presence of a properly 
worded SA 
Source: systematized by the authors. 
 
In general, it should be noted that at the initial stage of Basel IV implementation was 
expected by 2022 on risks and calculation of RWA, the minimum level — 72.5% should be 
gradually reached till 2027. However, a new crisis came faster than expected when the Covid 
Pandemic forced the world to isolate. In these circumstances, the banks have stated that they will 
not have the capacity to support the real economy [21]. Regulators and supervisors around the 
world have begun to reduce capital requirements and release capital, fearing that banks will not 
have enough resources for lending. In EU, in addition to the actions of European Central Bank to 
reduce capital requirements, France, Germany and the Netherlands have abandoned the 
countercyclical buffer. In addition, BCBS has taken steps to «free up operational opportunities for 
banks and supervisors as they respond to the economic performance of COVID-19» (BCBS, 2020) 
[9]. In particular, the introduction of Basel IV was postponed for one year, until early 2023. Under 
these conditions, the current state of global banking business indicates that the largest amount of 
generated banking capital is observed in China (Tabl. 3). 
Table 3 
Top-10 World-Scale Banks in Terms of Capital in 2020 
Rank Bank Country 








% $ bn % 
1 ICBC China 380 12,6 16,8 8,8 61,8 
2 China Construction Bank China 316 10,0 17,5 8,7 59,2 
3 Agricultural Bank of China China 278 14,3 16,1 7,8 62,2 
4 Bank of China China 258 12,4 15,6 7,9 62,0 
5 JP Morgan Chase & Co US 214 2,6 16,0 8,0 56,4 
6 Bank of America US 188 -0,3 14,8 7,7 61,4 
7 Wells Fargo & Co US 159 -5,3 15,8 8,2 64,6 
8 Citigroup US 155 -1,5 16,6 8,8 59,8 
9 HSBC UK 148 0,8 20,4 5,5 31,1 
10 Mitsubishi UFJ Japan 145 -2,1 15,9 4,6 34,2 
Source:  formed by the authors according to (The Banker, 2021). 
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It is worth to note the changes in the biggest banks’ rating over the last 20 years (Fig. 4). As 
can be seen from the presented data, Chinese banks have a fairly stable tendency to gain high 
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Fig. 4. Dynamics of Global Top-10 Banks in 20 Years 
Source: formed by the authors according to (The Banker, 2021). 
 
It is arguable that if there is anything positive about banks and economies around the world 
entering an period of unprecedented turbulence, it is the years of reform following the global 
financial crisis have created a safer, more capitalized banking system which is resilient to economic 
shocks. In the current terms, the regulatory requirements introduced after the crisis of 2007—2008 
may justify themselves. 
Conclusions. The study showed that the financial shocks which have accompanied the 
development of the banking business in recent decades, make adjustments in the process of 
regulating banks’ capital, which are controversial in terms of stabilizing the situation. 
A clear trend in the development of economic and banking systems, both in developed and 
developing countries, is the shift of emphasis to institutional transformation, improving the financial 
architecture and increasing the role of regulation in solving emerging problems, including 
fundamental ones. This trend is especially performs in banking and financial sectors, which are very 
sensitive to market factors and associated risks. 
Obviously, a number of shocks in connection with the crisis require the renewal and search 
for a new paradigm of regulation, which today is focused on achieving financial stability, 
overcoming pro-cyclicality, especially in the banking sector. One of the latest developments in the 
field of bank capital regulation has been the implementation of international banking supervision 
standards recommended by BCBS, which have been transformed from Basel I, Basel II, Basel III, 
Basel 3.5 to Basel IV. 
The new ideology suggests that in times of financial and economic crisis or in anticipation 
of growing uncertainty in the economy, it is necessary to abandon the idea of bank capital 
management and the creation of financial reserves to maintain liquidity and stability of financial 
institutions. These measures will not be able to protect the bank from default and bankruptcy. 
During a crisis, prudential supervision also loses effectiveness, as breaches of mandatory standards 
are often not linked to poor management or negligent behavior. 
The emergence of a new ideology is associated with the urgent need of the banking 
community to provide recommendations, the use of which could help overcome the negative effects 
of growing environmental aggression in a crisis. Aggression is manifested in the intensity of growth 
and a variety of risks that can have catastrophic consequences for banking. At the same time, 
maintaining proper performance of financial institutions depends on the ability of bank’s 
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management to «calculate risks», i.e. the ability to identify, forecast and regulate them, the ability of 
the regulator to assess and regulate the level of «risk appetite», the feasibility and effectiveness of 
measures to protect financial institution. This ideology has become a new paradigm of effective 
banking regulation, which can be formulated as an accepted set of three vectors: risk; risk 
management; risk-oriented supervision. 
However, although it is unlikely that the final form of Basel IV can be changed, under the 
quarantine restrictions caused by COVID-19, it will not be effective until used wisely by global 
regulators and supervisors in terms of finding a balance between the non-existent prudential rules 
and the ever-increasing compilation of standards. 
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